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Abstract
Ownership structure is endogenous to the formation of the economic entity in China. This paper investigates the 
determinants of employment choice of rural migrant workers across state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and various subtypes 
of non-state owned enterprises (non-SOEs). Two self-selection models are adopted to comparatively identify how the 
unobserved factors related to the migration decision affect employment choice. Using pooled cross-section data for 1995 
and 2002, results indicate that employment choice is positively selected with respect to the unobserved characteristics. 
Furthermore, wage and pension benefits exhibit positive relationships with the probability of employment in either type of 
enterprise.
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1. Introduction
Employment and maximum earning attainments are the main targets for the majority of migrants. This paper 
investigates the determinants of employment choice of rural migrant workers across state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) and various subtypes of non-state owned enterprises (non-SOEs). The novel feature of this work lies 
in the investigation of unexplored aspects behind the selection process. Specifically, it aims to provide new
insights into how the unobserved factors related to the migration decision affect employment choice.
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The study of employment choice across different ownership enterprises has received increasing attention in 
recent years not only because of a substantial rural-urban migration taking place in China, but also because a 
large proportion of migrants choose non-SOEs employment, which has emerged and gradually developed 
since the ownership reform in 1978. Statistics show that the number of rural migrants has reached up to 
approximately 153 million in 2011 and 75% of them were employed in non-SOEs. Identifying the key drivers 
of employment choice across different ownership enterprises becomes a necessity in understanding the urban 
labour market of Chinese transitional economy, such as whether rural migrants are voluntarily choosing either 
type of enterprise which is associated with a specific set of individual characteristics to maximize their 
utilities in employment, or whether employment choice is affected by the unobserved factors related to the 
migration decision, such as institutional constrains and labour market barriers. It is well known that SOEs, 
while under constant policy reforms, are still characterized by government-controlled labour allocation, that 
is, authorities supervise labour employment through introducing workers to SOEs instead of unilaterally 
allocating workers to enterprises as before (Brooks & Tao 2003). However, rural migrants are still in a weak 
position to access the urban welfare system and numerous types of jobs in the urban labour market due to 
their rural-hukou1 (Cai 2001). Therefore, the question remains whether institutional constrains and labour 
market barriers play an important role in employment choice. The findings of this paper suggest that this 
concern is founded and these unobserved factors significantly affect employment choice of rural migrant 
workers.
There is growing interest in the study of the determinants of employment choice across different ownership 
enterprises in China (Roberts 2001, Dong & Bowles 2002, Zhao 2002, Wang 2005, Démurger et al. 2009,
Gagnon et al. 2009). The present studies contribute to the current literature by exploring the impact of 
individual and regional characteristics on employment choice based on samples of a single year and multiple 
discrete-choice models. The results suggest that highly educated and skilled workers have a higher probability 
of joining in non-SOEs and that the determinants of employment choice among various subtypes of non-SOEs 
are different. But the impact of socio-economic variables, such as benefits, is neglected in existing research.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the data source, definitions of SOEs and non-
SOEs, and summary statistics of samples. The methodology and empirical results are described in Section 3 
and Section 4, respectively. Section 5 gives conclusions and policy implications.
2. Data and characteristics of samples
2.1. Data
The data used is drawn from the China Household Income Project (CHIP) conducted by the Institute of 
Economics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, with assistance from the Asian Development Bank and 
Ford Foundation. The samples were selected from significantly larger samples drawn by National Bureau of 
Statistics of China (NBSC), and accordingly CHIP data is more official and credible than other available data.
The cross-section data for 1995 and 2002 are used in this paper, which feature distinct samples of urban and 
rural China and also cover a large scale of variables to reflect the socioeconomic characteristics of the labour 
market, demographic information and migration history.
SOEs, in the official definition, denote those enterprises whose assets are owned or shares are controlled 
by the state, including those at the central/provincial level, those at the local level, and state share-holding 
1 The household registration (hukou) system generally divides individuals into those who have rural-hukou if they live off agricultural 
production and their household registrations are in rural areas, and those who have urban-hukou if their food supplies are rationed by the 
state. Migrants from rural areas possess a rural-hukou.
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enterprises. Non-SOEs in this paper are categorized into three groups based on China’s official statistics. The 
first group is UCEs, which denote enterprises affiliated with a local government under a municipality or a 
county. Compared with SOEs, UCEs are less government-supported and more business-oriented in that they 
are typically subject to more budget constraints and are responsible for their own profits and loss (Qian & Xu 
1993). The second group is wholly owned non-SOEs (hereinafter called private enterprises). They consist of 
urban private enterprises which hire more than seven employees each, urban self-employed enterprises which 
hire fewer than seven employees each, and foreign enterprises. The third group contains sino-foreign joint 
venture companies which are shared by public and foreign capital, and other share-holding companies.
2.2. Summary statistics of samples
Table 1 presents the employment percentage of rural labour, rural migrant workers, permanent migrants 
and urbanites in four types of enterprises - SOEs, UCEs, private and joint-venture/other enterprises. Note that 
rural labour refers to those who live in rural areas, have rural-hukou, and engage in non-agricultural jobs, 
while permanent migrants denote rural migrants who have owned urban-hukou since 1978. We can see that
permanent migrants and urbanites are mainly employed in SOEs, whereas rural migrant workers and rural 
labour primarily work in private enterprises. From 1995 to 2002, rural migrants double their employment 
percentages in private enterprises from about 42% to 84%. In contrast, the employment percentages of 
permanent migrants and urbanites in SOEs decline by about 30%.
Table 1. Employment percentage in different ownership enterprises
Rural labour Rural migrants Permanent migrants Urbanites
2002
SOEs
UCEs
Private
Joint-venture/other
8.65 8.97 53.74 53.14
11.56 4.58 10.39 10.81
77.06 83.60 22.90 21.41
2.73 2.84 12.98 14.64
Total 100 100 100 100
Observations 6,669 2,708 1,271 6,515
1995
SOEs
UCEs
Private
Joint-venture/other
14.50 9.52 76.78 81.06
10.35 19.26 16.84 15.28
36.95 41.68 3.65 1.94
38.20 29.54 2.74 1.72
Total 100 100 100 100
Observations 3,662 914 1,645 12,033
Table 2 describes summary statistics of rural migrant workers in the four types of enterprises. We observe 
that rural migrants with high educational levels (>= senior) are more willing to work in SOEs in 1995, while 
most of them tend to prefer joint-venture/other enterprises (JV) in 2002. Compared to 1995, the average 
wages obtained in non-SOEs are obviously larger than that in SOEs in 2002; for example, 819 RMB in 
private enterprises vs. 604 RMB in SOEs. Results also show that there is a larger coverage percentage of 
pensions in 2002, especially in SOEs (15%) and joint-venture/other enterprises (16%). However, the 
percentage is relatively low, and the official explanation is that rural migrants have been allocated access to 
farm land in rural origins, and hence their welfare rights and security are covered by the entitlement to the use 
of land (Song & Appleton 2008). For industrial distribution, the majority of rural migrant workers (>40%) in 
both SOEs and non-SOEs are employed in manufacturing in 1995. But in 2002, the largest proportion (>30%) 
of rural migrants in SOEs and UCEs are clustered in social services, 55% of rural migrants in private 
enterprises engage in wholesale, retail and food services (WRF).
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Table 2. Summary statistics of rural migrant workers in 1995 and 2002
1995 2002
SOEs UCEs Private JV SOEs UCEs Private JV
Age 27.45 25.88 24.75 24.49 35.89 33.85 34.47 32.31
Married (%) 43.68 40.23 38.50 32.59 86.83 93.44 91.01 83.12
Gender (%)
male 72.41 80.68 62.73 60.37 66.67 50.00 56.10 53.25
female 27.59 19.32 37.27 39.63 33.33 50.00 43.90 46.75
Education (%)
College and above 1.15 0 0.26 0 6.17 1.61 1.24 14.29
Senior 24.14 14.77 10.00 13.70 23.05 18.55 15.68 29.87
Junior 58.62 61.93 60.53 57.78 43.62 50.00 51.63 37.66
Elementary and below 16.09 23.30 29.21 28.52 27.16 29.84 31.45 18.18
Wage (RMB/month) 474.45 418.33 467.94 492.7 604.46 632.59 819.38 766.45
Rural non-agricultural experience 
(year)
3.31 2.14 1.95 2.24 6.82 6.99 7.21 6.22
Pension (%) 1.15 0.57 0 0.37 14.71 10.26 3.46 15.58
Working hours/day 8.05 8.52 9.20 9.00 9.29 9.25 10.46 9.05
Industrial distribution (%)
ILEP 15.00 5.06 4.25 4.52 9.62 6.50 3.78 10.16
Manufacturing 50.00 33.54 49.81 55.20 15.90 15.45 9.38 34.21
Construction 15.00 48.73 23.03 21.27 5.02 7.32 4.22 1.32
Wholesale/retail/food services 11.25 5.70 19.70 8.14 12.97 21.14 55.45 23.05
Social services 2.50 2.53 8.48 3.17 30.54 35.77 20.81 13.16
Education/Science/Culture 3.75 1.27 0.61 0.45 23.01 8.94 1.33 5.26
other 2.5 3.16 5.76 7.24 2.93 4.88 5.02 11.84
Note: Industries with low employment percentage (ILEP) denote those where employment percentage of rural migrants is less than 3%.
3. Methodology
3.1. Multinomial logit model
We append the data of CHIP 1995 and 2002 to jointly model employment choice of the both years. 
Accordingly, a pooled cross-section multinomial logit (MNL) model is used to solve multi-selection 
problems. The basic theory is described as follows. If all error terms are mutually independent, the probability 
of a rural migrant i choosing a type of enterprise j can be expressed by:
    ௜ܲ௝ = ܲ൫ݕ௜ = ݁݊ݐ݁ݎ݌ݎ݅ݏ݁௝൯ =
exp(ݔ௜ᇱߚ௝)
σ exp(ݔ௜ᇱߚ௞)
௠
௞ୀଵ
     ݅ = 1, …ܰ;   ݆ = 1, … ,݉.                        (1)
where x୧ is explanatory variables indicating characteristics of individual i, and Ⱦ୨ is its parameter. N is the 
sample size of rural migrants; m is the number of enterprise types, including SOEs (j=1), UCEs (j=2), private 
(j=3), and joint-venture/other enterprises (j=4).
The independent variables include age (15 to 60), gender (male=1), marital status (married=1), education 
(measured by years of schooling), ethnicity (ethnic minority=1), political identity (members of Communist 
Party of China=1), health (healthy=1), and industry dummies (ILEP=reference category). Ethnicity and 
political capital are selected to reflect the social characteristics of migrants affecting on employment choice,
while health can imply the differences of work strength in different enterprises. The socio-economic variables, 
such as wage/month, pension benefits, and working hours/day are also included. These variables varying
across different enterprises have been demonstrated as crucial factors in determining employment choice (Fan 
2001, Christofides & Pashardes 2002). We expect that rural migrants are more likely to enter into one type of 
enterprise which offers higher wages and more pension benefits while demanding less working hours.
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3.2. Selection adjustment
Another crucial issue in the identification of employment choice is whether unobserved factors related to 
the migration decision are correlated with employment choice. As migrants are not random samples of the 
population, the characteristics of individuals who choose to migrate determine the second source of selectivity
and are likely to be correlated with employment choice accordingly.
Instead of the usual Heckman’s approach, we employ the nested multinomial logit (NMNL) model to solve 
the above issue and it has three advantages. First, it is easier to apply control function approaches, where the 
second step estimation is multinomial logit, to nonlinear models, even relatively complicated ones. Second, it 
can indicate whether unobserved factors related to the migration decision are correlated with employment 
choice. If a likelihood-ratio (LR) test clearly rejects the inclusive value (IV) parameters to unity, an indication 
is shown that the NMNL is an appropriate method for the estimation of employment choice based on the used 
data and there is discernible relationship between the migration and employment choice. Finally, it is 
computationally straightforward and fast due to the existence of a closed-form expression for the likelihood
function.
This paper constructs a two-level NMNL model to reflect that the independent and irrelevant alternatives 
(IIA) assumption is preserved within the choice subgroup, while the IIA assumption is relaxed between the 
migration and non-migration decision (see figure 1 below). The upper-level consists of a migration nest and a
non-migration nest, which is built by aggregating migrant and non-migrant data. The bottom-level is 
composed of eight ownership enterprises that are clustered into the corresponding nest: SOEs, UCEs, private 
enterprises, joint-venture/other are clustered into the migration nest, and the same four enterprises are in the 
non-migration nest. One rural individual can be thought of being divided into a multiple level choice problem 
shown in the construction of our model. We conjecture that the unobserved factors related to the migration 
decision are correlated with employment choice.
The theory of the NMNL model is described as follows (Heiss 2002). The probability of individual i
choosing the alternative j, P(y୧ = j), is equal to the product of the probability to choose some alternatives in 
nest B(j), P{y୧ א B(j)}, and the conditional probability to choose exactly alternative j given some alternatives 
in the same nest B(j), P{y୧ = j|y୧ א B(j)}:
௜ܲ௝ = ܲ(ݕ௜ = ݆) =  ܲ{ݕ௜ = ݆|ݕ௜ א ܤ(݆)} ή  ܲ{ݕ௜ א ܤ(݆)}                                       (2)
where,  B(j) = {B୫: j א B୫, m = 1, … , M} . The number of nests M =2 standing for migration and non-
migration. i refers to a rural individual. j denotes eight types of enterprises for migration and non-migration.
The equation (2) can be further written as:
௜ܲ௝ =
݁௏೔ೕ ఛ(௝)Τ
σ ݁௏೔ೕ ఛ(௝)Τ௞א஻(௝)
×
݁ఛ(௝)ூ௏(௝)
σ ݁ఛ೘ூ௏೘ெ௠ୀଵ
                                                           (3)
SOEs
(mj=11)
Migration (m=1) Non-migration (m=0)
UCEs
(mj=12)
Private
(mj=13)
JV
(mj=14)
Fig. 1. Model nesting structure (simultaneous decision-making process)
SOEs
(mj=01)
UCEs
(mj=02)
Private
(mj=03)
JV
(mj=04)
Type of migration (migration choice)
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where V୧୨ = Ƚ୨ + X୧୨ᇱ Ⱦ + Z୧ᇱɀ୨, which is reflected by alternative-specific constants, the individual-and-choice 
varying variables (alternative-specific variables), and individual-specific variables. ɒ is called the dissimilarity 
parameter and represents the mutual correlation of error terms of all enterprises within a nest. IV୫ =
lnσ e୚౟ౡ தౣΤ୩א୆ౣ .
The independent variables in the choice equation consist of individual-specific variables and alternative-
specific variables (wage, working hours/day, and pension benefits). The individual-specific variables can be
directly observed, while alternative-specific variables, such as wage is weighted by the average value of the 
observations belonging to each of the 48 cells representing 8 types of ownership enterprises and 6 different 
levels of qualifications. The 6 different levels of qualifications are constructed by 3 educational levels (junior 
and below, senior, college and above) × 2 working experience (<= 7 and > 7 years). The educational levels 
and working experience are considered due to their important roles played in determining wage attainments 
(Giulietti et al. 2011). In a similar way, a cross table comprising of 133 rows (19 provinces × 7 industries) and 
8 columns of ownership enterprises is built for calculating working hours, and a table of 7 industries and 8 
types of enterprises is used for estimating pension benefits.
4. Empirical results
4.1. Multinomial logit model on the probability of employment choice
The estimation results of the MNL model are presented in Table 3. We observe that male migrants who are 
aged and members of Communist Party of China (CPC) are less likely to be non-SOEs workers, while the 
healthier are more likely to be non-SOEs workers. One explanation could be that non-SOEs are often 
characterized by longer working hours and more intensive work strength, which need younger and healthier
individuals to take such a demanding status.
Concerning the industry dummies, non-SOEs workers generally have a higher propensity for engaging in 
construction. The net odds of engaging in construction for being UCEs workers, private workers and joint-
venture workers are 5.7 times (= expଵ.଻ଷ଺଼), 3 times (= expଵ.ଵ଴଴଻), and 2.7 times (= exp଴.ଽ଻଺଴), respectively 
higher than those engaging in ILEP.
The propensity to choose private enterprises is higher when a higher monthly wage is offered even though 
longer working hours are demanded, while it tends to decrease with increasing pension benefits. This suggests 
that the high employment rate in private enterprises is primarily driven by wage incentives rather than the 
result of pension improvement.
In sum, rural migrants express a weaker preference for non-SOEs employment in 2002 than 1995. This is 
perhaps due to the job instability and high competitive pressure of non-SOEs. Also, the disparate scenarios of 
migrants’ employment in different ownership enterprises are presented, which are resulted not only from the 
different effect parameters of age, political capital, health, and industry dummies, but also the socio-economic 
variables, such as wage and benefits.
4.2. Selection adjustment on employment choice
This section investigates how the estimates presented before are affected by factors related to the migration 
decision. This is done by using a NMNL model, in which two equations - the migration equation and choice 
equation are estimated simultaneously for rural individuals. We observe that the LR test for IIA clearly rejects 
the IV parameters to unity, and the dissimilarity parameter ɒ୫୧୥୰ୟ୲ୣ is within the unit interval and corresponds 
to a correlation of error terms of about 0.9748 (see Table 4). This implies the unobserved factors that lead 
rural individuals to migrate and that affect employment choice are correlated.
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Table 3. Multinomial logit model: Pooled two cross-sections (1995 and 2002)
UCEs Private Joint-venture/other
Variables Coefficient Marginal Coefficient Marginal Coefficient Marginal
Male -0.7371*** -0.0098 -0.4572** -0.0041 -0.6715** -0.0039
(0.2648) (0.0074) (0.1833) (0.0116) (0.3133) (0.0049)
Age -0.0287** -0.0001 -0.0288*** -0.0014 -0.0355** -0.0004
(0.0137) (0.0007) (0.0092) (0.0011) (0.0149) (0.0006)
Married 0.7651 -0.0143 0.3490 0.0245 0.1141 -0.0130
(0.4904) (0.0158) (0.3054) (0.0288) (0.3252) (0.0118)
Member of CPC -1.5188** -0.0326* -0.9388*** -0.1228** 0.2174 0.0749*
(0.6409) (0.0179) (0.2982) (0.0545) (0.4280) (0.0392)
Ethnic minority -0.2249 0.0022 -0.2992 -0.0317 0.0894 0.0084
(0.3540) (0.0170) (0.2431) (0.0294) (0.4629) (0.0099)
Schooling 0.0532 0.0049 0.0077 -0.0033 0.1458** 0.0024**
(0.0532) (0.0017) (0.0351) (0.0023) (0.0671) (0.0010)
Health 0.8095*** 0.0149** 0.5779*** 0.0278 0.6163*** 0.0032
(0.2275) (0.0087) (0.1745) (0.0197) (0.2144) (0.0067)
Industries (reference: ILEP)
Manufacturing 0.4049 -0.0026 0.4665* 0.0140 0.7702** 0.0162
(0.3666) (0.0178) (0.2470) (0.0289) (0.3502) (0.0161)
Education/Science/Culture -0.5272 0.0728 -1.7165*** -0.2667*** -1.1615** 0.0081
(0.4678) (0.0493) (0.3077) (0.0696) (0.5762) (0.0275)
Social Services 0.5473 0.0006 0.6123** 0.0629** -0.3600 -0.0315***
(0.3787) (0.0190) (0.2446) (0.0256) (0.4243) (0.0102)
Construction 1.7368** 0.0516* 1.1007*** 0.0049 0.9760** -0.0051
(0.4047) (0.0302) (0.3094) (0.0358) (0.4088) (0.0130)
WRF 0.9482** -0.0578*** 2.2837*** 0.2316*** 0.9406* -0.0432***
(0.4018) (0.0166) (0.2674) (0.0254) (0.4010) (0.0128)
other 1.0718* -0.0165 1.4544*** 0.0618** 1.5966** 0.0107
(0.5552) (0.0189) (0.4040) (0.0304) (0.5135) (0.0197)
Year (reference: 1995)
Year 2002 -1.9442*** -0.1980*** 0.3709 0.3321*** -1.9053*** -0.1413***
(0.4881) (0.0589) (0.3230) (0.0567) (0.4561) (0.0431)
Wage/month 0.0005 -0. 0003*** 0.0015*** 0.0008*** 0.0012*** -2.93e-06
(0.0004) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0000)
Working hours/day 0.0231 -0.0047*** 0.1782*** 0.0151*** -0.0593 -0.0039***
(0.0558) (0.0015) (0.0370) (0.0025) (0.0712) (0.0011)
pension -0.5329 0.0475* -1.6561*** -0.1789*** -0.9456** 0.0110
(0.4142) (0.0260) (0.2875) (0.0453) (0.4632) (0.0114)
Constant 0.1584 1.6571*** 1.3718**
(0.6059) (0.4339) (0.5979)
Pseudo R-Square 0.1896
LR chi2 547.55
(p) 0.0000
Observations 2,443
Log likelihood -1169.9719
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses.* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. The reference category is SOEs.
The estimates of migration correcting for the migration selectivity bias are shown in Table 4. While the 
profiles of individual characteristics are essentially similar to those in Table 3, differences are also revealed. 
Migrants with high education present a higher probability of employment in joint-venture/other enterprises 
than that reported in Table 3. Each additional year of schooling significantly increases the probability of 
employment in joint-venture/other enterprises by 1.2785 (p<0.01). This is consistent with previous studies, 
which indicate that individuals with high education are more likely to be non-SOEs workers due to high 
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returns provided. Also, the decentralized environment and flexible wage-setting mechanism play a motivating 
role in choosing non-SOEs for the more educated (Zhang et al. 2005).
Wage and pension are significantly positive (p<0.01), suggesting that the probability of being one type of 
enterprise increases by 0.0029 and 5.1975 respectively for an increase of wage and pension, and the 
probability for all other types decreases, as expected. The greater coefficient of pension benefits also shows 
that offering pension has a considerably stronger impact than that of increasing wages, and accordingly 
attracts more rural migrants in the urban labour market.
Working hour is also a positive determinant of employment choice. Rural migrants are more likely to go 
into either type of enterprise which can let them work more than 1.5 hour per day. This finding contradicts our 
hypothesis that rural migrants are more likely to go into one type of enterprise which demands less working 
hours. The possible reason is that longer working hours lead to higher earnings, which in turn increase 
migrants’ employment as shown in previous studies (Portes & Zhou 1996, Chen et al. 2005). In this case, 
longer working hours can be characterized as a “necessity” rather than “unfair treatments” for rural migrants. 
This is contrary to previous qualitative research (Lu 2003, Wong et al. 2007) which finds that long working 
hours manifest the discrimination against rural migrants in employment.
5. Conclusions and implications
This paper is relevant to providing theoretical models and empirical results that reflect employment 
preferences of rural migrant workers and key drivers of employment choice across different ownership 
enterprises since the China’s economic reform in 1978. The main findings accompanied by the corresponding 
policy implications are indicated as follows:
First, different types of enterprises exhibit different characteristics in the employment of rural migrant 
workers. SOEs have compelling advantages in less demanding and stressed status, while non-SOEs are 
characterized by a more deregulated market institution and diverse types in attracting migrants. In particular, 
UCEs workers have a higher propensity for engaging in wholesale/retail/food services and construction. 
Private enterprises afford high-paid wages, which to some extent are attributed to longer working hours. The 
high-skilled and educated migrants can receive higher marginal benefits and well treatments in joint-
venture/other enterprises and accordingly present a high employment rate. Being familiar with such 
characteristics and understanding the operation mechanisms in different ownership enterprises will help rural 
migrants to make better employment decisions and best repay their individual characteristics.
Second, longer working hours can be characterized as a “necessity” rather than “unfair treatments” for 
rural migrants. This is because maximum earning attainment is the main target for most rural migrants. To 
achieve this goal, migrants are willing to work longer hours to compensate for low hourly earnings, and 
therefore less concern about work environment and work strength. 
Third, high-paid wages and more pension benefits are two major determinants to increase the employment 
rate in SOEs and non-SOEs. Also, pension benefits tend to have larger impact than high-paid wages in 
increasing the likelihood of employment in either type of enterprise.
Finally, schooling significantly increases the probability of employment in joint-venture/other enterprises. 
This is primarily driven by high returns to education and decentralized environment. This implication is 
worthy of consideration for policy makers and SOEs managers to increase the employment rate of high-
skilled and professional migrants, who are relatively cheap labour but make substantial contribution to 
increasing productivity.
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Table 4. Nested multinomial logit model of migration: Pooled two cross-sections (1995 and 2002)
Lower-level equation ( SOEs = reference category)
UCEs Private Joint-venture/other
Variables Coefficient Marginal Coefficient Marginal Coefficient Marginal
Male -0.0434*** -0.0089** -0.7646** -0.0722** -1.3991*** -0. 0404**
(1.3871) (0.0140) (0.6631) (0.0103) (1.5919) (0.0098)
Age -0.1255** -0.0006* -0.0390*** -0.0003** -0.0082*** -0.0002
(0.0962) (0.0005) (0.0386) (0.0008) (0.1052) (0.0003)
Married -2.7243 0.0122 -1.9345 0.0081 -0.6431 -0.0044
(2.9997) (0.0099) (0.9983) (0.0211) (2.5838) (0.0089)
Member of CPC -3.2204** -0.0129 -1.4861*** -0.0888** 2.8530* 0.0389
(3.4970) (0.0158) (1.0077) (0.0452) (2.0874) (0.0263)
Ethnic minority -2.0535 0.0029 -1.2538 -0.0256 5.7195 0.0084
(2.2040) (0.0128) (1.1285) (0.0219) (2.2071) (0.0099)
Schooling 1.1909 0.0014 0.3564 0.0033 1.2785*** 0.0024**
(0.3346) (0.0015) (0.1665) (0.0023) (0.5547) (0.0010)
Health 4.9927*** 0.0067** 2.9026*** 0.0306 4.1054*** 0.0014
(4.1430) (0.0105) (0.9154) (0.0215) (3.0045) (0.0079)
Industry dummy (reference: ILEP)
Manufacturing 3.0275 0.0007 2.0212 0.0060 3.4590** 0.0109
(2.9911) (0.0181) (0.2440) (0.0248) (0.5636) (0.0128)
Education/Science/Culture 2.6146 0.0755 -9.8549*** -0.2300*** -5.4495** 0.0082
(0.4679) (0.0565) (4.1304) (0.0762) (3.6104) (0.0170)
Social Services 2.7288 0.0105 4.2830** 0.0225 -6.3817 -0.0136**
(0.0008) (0.0193) (2.4890) (0.0229) (4.8374) (0.0063)
Construction 4.2589** 0.0309 3.0500*** 0.0094 9.7038*** -0.0157***
(4.1637) (0.0344) (1.3153) (0.0362) (-3.7708) (0.0048)
WRF 4.1390** -0.0326* 8.3854*** 0.1574*** 2.8874** -0.0206**
(1.0495) (0.0178) (3.6911) (0.0269) (1.6003) (0.0100)
other 4.3812* 0.0035 4.5621** 0.0222 4.3760** 0.0066
(2.1512) (0.0227) (2.1514) (0.0281) (2.1509) (0.0139)
Year (reference: 1995)
Year 2002 -2.0375*** -0.0819 1.8863 0.0008 -2.3187*** -0.0293
(0.1572) (0.0034) (0.1123) (0.0001) (0.2404) (0.0001)
Wage/month 0.0029*** 0.0004** 0.0029*** 0.0004** 0.0029*** 0.0004**
(0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003)
Working hours/day 0.0689*** 0.0049** 0.0689*** 0.0049** 0.0689*** 0.0049**
(0.0181) (0.0182) (0.0181) (0.0182) (0.0181) (0.0182)
Pension 5.1975*** 0.0384* 5.1975*** 0.0384* 5.1975*** 0.0384*
(0.1914) (0.0199) (0.1914) (0.0199) (0.1914) (0.0199)
Constant -4.1344 2.1629** -2.0324***
(2.3122) (2.0199) (2.5631)
Upper-level equation (non-migration = reference category)
Non-agricultural work 
experience
0.0338***
(0.0093)
dissimilarity parameters
tau-migrate 0.9748
tau-non-migrate 0.6285
LR test for IIA (tau = 1) chi2(2) = 357.72, Prob> chi2 = 0.0000
Cases 9,314
Wald chi2 781.34
(P) 0.0000
Log Likelihood -3886.8689
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. The reference category is SOEs.
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Our study broadens the current perspectives on employment choice across different ownership enterprises 
by correcting for the impact of the migration decision and accordingly comes out the above findings, some of 
which are contrary to previous studies. These findings indicate that even though several-decades-long 
economic reforms have been implemented in China, the institutional barriers (e.g. the hukou system) and 
labour market constraints (e.g. the government-controlled operation mechanisms in SOEs) still play powerful 
roles in influencing employment choice of rural migrants. A question which requires further research is still 
open: would more rural migrants like to become non-SOEs workers along with the relaxing hukou system and 
bureaucratic mechanisms of SOEs?
References
Brooks, R. & Tao, R. 2003. "China's Labour Market Performance and Challenges". IMF Working Paper WP/03/210. Washington, DC, 
Estados Unidos: Fondo Monetario Internacional.
Cai, F. 2001. "Institutional Barriers in Two Processes of Rural Labor Migration in China". Working Paper Series No. 9. Beijing: Institute 
of Population Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.
Chen, Y., Démurger, S. & Fournier, M. 2005. Earnings Differentials and Ownership Structure in Chinese Enterprises. Economic 
Development and Cultural Change, 53, 933-958.
Christofides, L. N. & Pashardes, P. 2002. Self/Paid-employment, Public/Private Sector Selection, and Wage Differentials. Labour 
Economics, 9, 737-762.
Démurger, S., Gurgand, M., Li, S. & Yue, X. 2009. Migrants as Second-Class Workers in Urban China? A Decomposition Analysis. 
Journal of Comparative Economics, 37, 610-628.
Dong, X.-Y. & Bowles, P. 2002. Segmentation and Discrimination in China's Emerging Industrial Labour Market. China Economic 
Review, 13, 170-196.
Fan, C. C. 2001. Migration and Labor-Market Returns in Urban China: Results from a Recent Survey in Guangzhou. Environment and 
Planning A, 33, 479-508.
Gagnon, J., Xenogiani, T. & Xing, C. 2009. "Are All Migrants Really Worse off in Urban Labour Markets? New Empirical Evidence
from China". IARIW-SAIM Conference Working paper 278.
Giulietti, C., Ning, G. & Zimmermann, F. K. 2011. "Self-Employment of Rural-to-Urban Migrants in China". IZA Discussion Paper No. 
5805, Bonn.
Heiss, F. 2002. Structural Choice Analysis with Nested Logit Models. The Stata Journal, 2, 227-252.
Lu, X. 2003. Fundamentally Solve the Issue of Rural Migrant Workers. Theory and Practice of SEZs, 7, 31-36 (in Chinese).
Portes, A. & Zhou, M. 1996. Self-Employment and the Earnings of Immigrants. American Sociological Review, 61, 219-230.
Qian, Y. & Xu, C. 1993. Why China's Economic Reforms Differ: The M Form Hierarchy and Entry/Expansion of the Non-state Sector. 
Economics of Transition, 1, 135-170.
Roberts, K. D. 2001. The Determinants of Job Choice by Rural Labour Migrants in Shanghai. China Economic Review, 12, 15-39.
Song, L. & Appleton, S. 2008. "Social Protection and Migration in China: What can Protect Migrants from Economic Uncertainty?". IZA 
Discussion Papers No. 3594, Bonn.
Wang, M. 2005. Employment Opportunities and Wage Gaps in the Urban Labour Market: A Study of the Employment and Wages of 
Migrant Labour. Journal of China Social Science, 5, 36-46 (in Chinese).
Wong, D. F. K., Li, C. Y. & Song, H. X. 2007. Rural Migrant Workers in Urban China: Living a Marginalized Life. International Journal 
of Social Welfare, 16, 32-40.
Zhang, J., Zhao, Y., Park, A. & Song, X. 2005. Economic returns to schooling in urban China, 1988 to 2001. Journal of Comparative 
Economics, 33, 730-752.
Zhao, Y. 2002. Earnings Differentials Between State and Non-state Enterprises in Urban China. Pacific Economic Review, 7, 181-197.
